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H.R.

## International Narcotics Biweekly Review

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INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS BIWEEKLY REVIEW

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
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This publication is prepared by analysts in the National Foreign Assessment Center for specialists in the Washington community who are interested in international narcotics matters. Comments and queries are welcome.

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EGYPT: Opium Problems

An Egyptian security patrol checking on opium production was ambushed last month and one police officer was killed. The attack took place near al-Minya, about 200 miles south of Cairo, in an area where opium plantings have increased substantially in the last year. Egyptian police are planning a major sweep of the area shortly.

Opium poppies have traditionally been cultivated in small amounts in the Minya and Asyut areas of upper Egypt. The plantings have increased in recent years, however, largely as a result of the ban on opium poppy growing in Turkey, which had previously supplied most of Egypt's illicit opium.

Egyptian narcotics police estimate that about 200 acres were planted in poppies last year, yielding about 25 kilograms of raw opium per acre. Much of the opium is intermingled with cotton and sugar cane--the area's traditional crops--making detection difficult. There is no evidence of opium conversion to heroin in Egypt.

Egypt's Anti-Narcotics General Administration (ANGA) appears determined to root out the opium production, but is clearly meeting stiff resistance from the well-armed traffickers who are probably helped along by widespread corruption among local officials.

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BURMA: The Communist Role in Narcotics Production

The Burmese Communist Party apparently continues to take an ambivalent attitude toward opium production in the area it controls in northeast Burma. While professing a determination to stamp out poppy cultivation, it continues its limited involvement in the narcotics trade out of interest in profits. Also, the Communists remain hesitant to alienate tribesmen who depend on poppy cultivation for a livelihood.

The imposition this year of higher taxes on opium production and a broadened ban on poppy cultivation suggest that the Communists want to give an appearance of progress in carrying through with their 1975 dictum for a halt in the opium trade. In collecting the current crop this spring, the Communists imposed a 60-percent tax on the harvest, to be paid in kind, and required growers to sell the remaining 40 percent to dealers operating out of Communist-controlled collection depots. The opium tax in previous years had averaged 10 percent, and growers had considerable leeway in disposing of the rest of their crop.

The Communists reportedly have decreed that poppy cultivation will no longer be allowed in areas where other crops, particularly rice, can be grown. They will, however, continue to issue permits for poppy cultivation in mountainous areas not suited for other crops.

Despite a tightening of restrictions, continued Communist interest in opium earnings is evidenced in a report of a heroin refinery at a Communist military camp near the Chinese border. Most of the heroin produced is smuggled to towns in northern Burma to be sold.

Also, in early April narcotics traffickers in the eastern Shan State reported an increase in the availability of Burmese Communist - produced impure morphine base.

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Although higher priced than competing brands, it found a ready market because of its consistently high quality. The Communists have pushed sales by sending a sales representative to Kengtung on at least one occasion.

These activities suggest a Communist effort to eliminate middlemen costs by processing themselves a larger portion of the raw opium collected from the 1978 crop.

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COLOMBIA: Drug Control Reorganization

Colombian plans to centralize narcotics control enforcement under the Attorney General's office are progressing on schedule.\* An initial contingent of seemingly competent and enthusiastic personnel already has been appointed to the new unit, which is slated to become fully operational later this summer. Supplemental funding will not be delayed as the Finance Ministry has approved the Attorney General's narcotics operation budget.

The reorganization is intended to eliminate the confusion, inefficiency, and rivalries prevalent under the previous division of drug control responsibilities among several government agencies. The decree authorizing the special narcotics unit, however, does not give the Attorney General sole responsibility in the drug field. While it does give him paramount authority over drug control, the Attorney General's organization will need cooperation from other enforcement units, particularly Customs, if it is to carry out its duties.

The Attorney General's group--which was originally proposed by and received subsequent support from President Lopez--will also need strong backing from the new government to be elected next month. Both presidential candidates have verbally endorsed the reorganization. A good indication, however, of the next president's seriousness about cooperating with the US on bilateral drug control will be the extent to which he translates words of support into actions at least comparable to those of Lopez.

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NOTEWORTHY POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS

(Editor's Note: These items, produced for another CIA publication, do not deal specifically with the international narcotics situation. They are included here, however, because they concern developing situations that could impact on the international narcotics control effort.)

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TURKEY: Political Violence

When Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit returned to power last January, his stated goals were to end the country's international isolation brought on by the quarrels with Greece, to revive the deteriorating economy, and to curb political violence, which last year produced 800 bombings and caused 321 deaths and nearly 4,000 injuries. Some progress has been made on foreign policy and the economy, but the domestic security situation has worsened markedly.

So far this year some 130 people have been killed, a thousand have been injured, and 500 bombings have occurred. The last two months have been especially bloody, and both the extreme left and extreme right have staged mass protest demonstrations--against the actions of the other side.

Rightist and leftist student gangs in the country's four major urban centers have been engaged in vendettas for years. Now popular unrest seems to be on the rise in the more rural eastern provinces, and government officials are more and more the victims of attacks.

The assassination two weeks ago of the opposition-backed Kurdish mayor of a town in southeastern Turkey, for example, touched off two days of antileftist rioting

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that led to mass arrests and heavy property damage, including the destruction of the local office of Ecevit's Republican People's Party. The Army was called in to restore order. Army troops also had to be brought in to help quell recent disturbances in two other eastern towns.

The strife is in part an outgrowth of the sharp cleavage in Turkish society between leftist "modernizers" and Islamic traditionalists and nationalists. The deepening of this split in the 1960s led to the emergence of rival extremist groups on the left and right.

Student unrest has been fueled by an antiquated educational system and bleak employment prospects for high school and university graduates. Over time, student violence has become more random and largely devoid of ideological or other motivation except that of revenge. In addition to right-left differences and student discontent, violence feeds on traditions of lawlessness, blood feuds, sectarian disputes between Sunni and Shia Muslims, and Kurdish separatist aspirations.

Politicians Wary

Officials are reluctant to move decisively to curb the violence for a number of reasons. Turkish society has thus far seemed inured to the clashes, the students involved compose only a small minority of the student population, and the country's leaders have not felt under pressure to take a strong stand. The major political groups on the left and right have been unwilling to give up the added clout that their extremist supporters provide.

Violence in eastern Turkey, although it always has been a concern to the military, lacks immediacy for the political elite in the west. A reluctance to compromise the country's democratic credentials, which are a major component of the Turks' self-image as a "Western" and "European" country, and a dislike of military involvement in politics also account for the politicians' rejection of martial law.

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Ecevit's Approach

Martial law or other repressive means of rule run counter to Ecevit's personal beliefs and his desire to portray himself as a social democrat and defender of human rights. Ecevit, when lobbying with allies for greater economic and military assistance, has made much of the fact that Turkey is unusual among developing countries in retaining its democratic institutions.

The Prime Minister, moreover, was highly critical of the martial law period that Turkey experienced from 1971 to 1973, both because it brought the military back into politics and because his party, particularly its left wing, suffered the most. He may also believe that repressive tactics would needlessly alienate his leftist supporters and that they would again serve only as stop-gap measures.

Ecevit's approach to curbing the strife has been more subtle and gradual. He named a no-nonsense retired Air Force General, Irfan Ozaydinli, as Interior Minister. Ozaydinli has sought to improve the morale and training of the police and has fired unqualified or incompetent officers. Arrests are double the rate of last year, and more extremists are being brought to trial.

Ecevit has appointed new provincial governors and has approved the use of regular Army troops to put down violence in extreme cases. In addition, he has sought to weed out extremists from the bureaucracy, especially those rightists who secured their positions under earlier rightwing governments.

Outlook

Although Ecevit's approach has not shown much success so far, he still has some maneuvering room. His political opponents lack the strength to bring him down, and his own supporters, including the independents on whom his tenure ultimately depends, seem willing to go along with his policies. There have been rumblings from the military, but the generals have shown no indication of wanting to involve themselves directly in government.

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The next few weeks will be important for Ecevit. The students' gang warfare normally subsides during vacation, which lasts from June to November. If the unrest in the east also subsides, and if Ecevit can persuade less extreme leftists and rightists to exercise restraint in the coming weeks, he will have bought several more months to test his approach.

Over the longer term, however, Ecevit's gradualism faces major obstacles. Violence has been increasing for years and to a large extent is now feeding on itself. If Ecevit's approach does not work, the military is likely to confront him eventually with the choice of imposing sterner measures or leaving office.

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Noteworthy Political and  
Economic Developments

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COLOMBIA: Prospects and Implications for the Presidential  
Election

There is less doubt about the outcome of Colombia's presidential race on 4 June than there is about the ability of the winner to solve the country's many pressing problems and preserve its democratic system.

A host of serious political, social, and economic problems--persistent high inflation, increasing urban terrorism, rampant crime, and widespread governmental corruption stemming in large part from narcotics trafficking--have plagued President Lopez throughout much of his term. The repeated failure of the country's leadership to come to grips with these problems has created an atmosphere of national erosion and has generated increasing political apathy among the electorate. It has also led to growing dissatisfaction and distrust within the military about the civilian leaders' ability to solve Colombia's problems.

Many of the issues that will be inherited by the next administration stem from President Lopez' inability to cope effectively with the legacy of the National Front. Under the Front--which was designed to bring to an end a decade of bloody political warfare and military dictatorship--the country's two major political parties, the Liberals and Conservatives, agreed to alternate the presidency for four four-year terms beginning in 1958. They also pledged to maintain equal representation in Congress through 1974 and in appointive offices through 1978.

The Lopez administration was intended to bridge the transition from rigid coalition rule to competitive democracy. In addition to overseeing the end of political parity, Lopez hoped to achieve greater social and

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*Julio Cesar Turbay*

economic equality among Colombians through a wide-ranging program of reforms. For the most part, however, his efforts have turned out to be too little and too late. The challenge will pass to his successor--probably Julio Cesar Turbay, the recently proclaimed Liberal Party standard bearer, but conceivably his Conservative Party rival, Belisario Betancur.

The Liberal Party Candidate:  
Julio Cesar Turbay

The 62-year-old Turbay is a shrewd politician, but his lack of a formal education and his Lebanese ancestry have prevented him from being accepted as part of the ruling elite. He represents a class of professional politicians--with relatively undistinguished origins--that has assumed control of the Liberal Party, essentially displacing the traditional aristocratic politicians like Lopez and former President Lleras.

Turbay's extensive and diversified government service has afforded him ample opportunity to absorb practical and technical information on a wide range of subjects. Although he espouses economic reforms, his policies will probably be traditional, reflecting the views of his US-trained advisers.

Perhaps more important than Turbay's handling of the economy, however, will be the position he takes regarding narcotics trafficking--a multimillion dollar industry in Colombia--and related



*Belisario Betancur*

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government corruption. Turbay is distrusted by many civilians and some military leaders because of his alleged affiliation with unsavory groups and the reputed involvement of members of his family with powerful rings of drug traffickers. Turbay will be indebted to a large number of political bosses who secured the votes for his nomination. These political patrons, some of whom may be actively involved in trafficking or may be providing official protection to drug smugglers will have power and influence in a Turbay administration.

Any increase in corruption or decline of authority in the presidential office, especially if accompanied by another surge of kidnappings and general lawlessness, will create pressures for military intervention. There have already been rumors that the Colombian military will not accept a Turbay presidency, but we do not believe that the armed forces would prevent his inauguration.

The Conservative Party Candidate: Belisario Betancur

The 55-year-old Betancur--a man of relatively humble origins with an extensive background in journalism--is a highly ambitious man who seems to be genuinely concerned for the underprivileged masses of Colombia.

His policy statements during two previous bids for the presidency have generated speculation that, if elected, he would be inclined to pursue a tougher policy on US private investment, especially in petroleum. His most recent statements suggest a mellowing in his views, however, and he apparently now advocates the participation of foreign capital, provided it is on terms favorable to national development.

Although Betancur is his party's presidential candidate, he has experienced difficulty in gaining acceptance as its leader. A compromise candidate, Betancur is faced with the need to keep peace in his party while at the same time projecting a national image designed to secure the desperately needed backing of non-Conservatives.

The Campaign

The heritage of the Liberal-Conservative blood feud of pre - National Front days is likely to become apparent

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as the campaign progresses. Interparty rancor, however, probably will be minimized to avoid damaging the bipartisan cooperation that has benefited both parties and Colombian democracy for the last two decades.

Some Conservatives and other political observers believe that former President Carlos Lleras--who suffered a crushing defeat in his quest for the Liberal Party's presidential nomination--may hold the key to the outcome of the June election. The various Liberal Party candidates had agreed to unite their factions behind the contender winning the most congressional votes, but Lleras apparently cannot bring himself to support Turbay, a longtime political enemy.

Lleras will not play outright spoiler by running on a maverick ticket, but he has notified his followers that they are not bound by any agreement and are "free to vote their conscience." Betancur's progressive image undoubtedly will attract many of these unattached Liberal votes, and other dissident Liberals may be drawn to independent candidates, none of whom is expected to play a decisive role in the campaign.

In theory, the election could be close if Betancur receives enough of the uncommitted Lleras votes and if a substantial amount of potential Turbay support is diffused among independent party candidates. In fact, however, Turbay is likely to win a decisive victory. His ironclad control of the Liberal Party's grass-roots political machinery is a formidable asset, particularly if the voter turnout for the presidential election is as low as it was for the congressional balloting, when less than 30 percent of the electorate voted.

The high rate of abstention stems partly from the belief of many Colombians that their votes have little influence because government policies are still closely linked to the rigid National Front era. In addition, much of the electorate has lost confidence in government officials, who are increasingly suspected of being corrupt or inept. Many Colombians believe that such political indifference is dangerous because it favors the emergence of a military leader.

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There is negative feeling, however, regarding military rule. The unsavory image of Rojas Pinilla, the military dictator who staged a coup in 1953 to end the protracted violence and political turmoil gripping the country, is still strong in the minds of many Colombians.

Military leaders currently have mixed feelings about the political role of the armed forces in Colombia. Clearly, they would prefer to leave the management of government in civilian hands. At the same time, they increasingly perceive the country's economic problems and deteriorating internal security as not only a threat to the government, but to the military as well.

#### Prospects

On the surface, Colombia's present economic, social, and political problems do not immediately threaten its democratic institutions. The widespread corruption, inefficiency of government, and rampant crime, however, have created an atmosphere approaching moral anarchy. This malaise has increased during Lopez' administration in spite of the fact that he took office with the support of a majority Liberal bloc in Congress and seemingly possessed the political acumen to confront and solve the nation's problems.

Turbay, who in his own way is perhaps as skilled a politician as Lopez, still has to overcome the divisiveness in his own party. More important, he will have to overcome the reputation that has caused many of his countrymen to regard him with animosity and suspicion. If he cannot do this, Turbay will be personally blamed for failing to solve the same problems that have afflicted the Lopez government. This would make it easier for the armed forces to justify a coup, especially if inflation, labor strikes, and a rash of kidnappings were to occur simultaneously during a Turbay presidency.

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AFGHANISTAN: Assessment of the Coup

The five-year-old regime of President Mohammad Daoud in Afghanistan came to an abrupt--and bloody--end on 27 April when a military coup put pro-Soviet Communists in control of the government. The installation in Kabul of a leftist regime led by Nur Mohammad Taraki has seriously alarmed the governments of neighboring Iran and Pakistan and heightened their fears of Soviet regional ambitions.

The coup apparently had its genesis in the murder of a Communist leader on 17 April. Two days later, the supposedly weak Communists mobilized a well-disciplined funeral procession in which 15,000 persons participated. On 26 April, the government arrested the leaders of the main Communist Party, and that action appears to have triggered the coup.

Fighting broke out about noon the next day when tanks from a nearby armored division attacked government buildings in Kabul, including the presidential palace and the Defense and Interior Ministries. Troops loyal to Daoud put up strong resistance, but the intervention of Air Force planes finally turned the tide in the rebels' favor.

The victors dealt brutally with possible opposition. Several of the leading figures in the old government, including Daoud, his brother Naim, the recently appointed vice president, and at least two Cabinet ministers were killed. There were mass executions in Kabul of lower ranking supporters of Daoud, including soldiers who surrendered after the coup.

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Nur Mohammad Taraki has been named both President of the newly established Revolutionary Council and Prime Minister. Other senior party members hold most key Cabinet posts. In deference to the nation's conservative elements, however, the new regime has sought to emphasize its Islamic and nationalist credentials. To further play down its Communist orientation, the government is establishing a new People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan. The party's central committee is to become the highest authority in the state.

Responsibility for government may be shared to a degree with the military. Two officers have been included in the Cabinet--one as Minister of Defense, the other as a Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Communications. Both officers are leftists--and probably members of Taraki's party.

The new regime appears to be in full control of the cities as well as the countryside, but several factors could threaten its future stability:

- Taraki's party is an amalgam of two pro-Soviet Communist factions that merged last year under pressure from Moscow. Personality and policy differences exist and could lead to infighting among the faction leaders in the absence of a common foe.
- The degree of unity between the civilian leadership and its military allies is unclear. Again, power struggles or ideological conflicts could result.
- The prominence of Communists in the new government risks arousing rightist opposition in this still tribal, deeply Islamic society. The Muslim Brotherhood, an extreme rightwing terrorist organization could launch a wave of assassinations and sabotage.
- Any measure of popular support the government now enjoys could erode if it fails to address the economic problems of the people.

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Although there is no evidence that the coup was ordered by Moscow, officials of both Iran and Pakistan see a Soviet hand behind it and anticipate increased Soviet meddling in the affairs of the region in an attempt to secure improved access to the Indian Ocean. Pakistan is particularly concerned that Daoud's efforts to establish better relations with Islamabad will now be repudiated and that the dormant border dispute between the two nations will flare anew.

While the Soviet threat may be exaggerated, Soviet news broadcasts have become openly favorable to Taraki's regime. The USSR was the first nation to recognize the new government, and the Soviet Ambassador was the first foreign diplomat to be received by Taraki after assuming power.

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AFGHANISTAN: REPRESENTATIVE OF NEW REGIME IN KABUL RE-AFFIRMS GOVERNMENT'S COMMITMENT TO THE NARCOTICS CONTROL EFFORT. Following the recent coup, UN narcotics advisers in Kabul met with their counterpart in the new government and were offered assurances that the new regime will be more active than its predecessor in controlling the cultivation of opium and in halting narcotics smuggling. These assurances were made on behalf of the new Minister of Interior. The UN representatives were informed that the new regime probably will want to expand and accelerate the present project.

According to the US Mission in Geneva, however, the UN Fund for Drug Abuse Control, (UNFDAC) has taken a "wait-and-see" attitude until the domestic situation in Afghanistan clarifies. Consultations on the Upper Helmand Project have been postponed indefinitely, and a freeze has been placed on the delivery of \$400,000 worth of equipment already in the pipeline, pending clarification of the new government's intentions. [REDACTED]

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INDIA: NEW DELHI TO BUILD PROCESSING PLANT FOR OPIUM POPPY STRAW. The Indian Government is proceeding with plans to build a new industrial plant to process the poppy straw that is left after the raw opium, or opium latex, has been harvested. A Yugoslav team is scheduled to arrive in New Delhi this month to discuss the project and to arrange for Yugoslav technical assistance. The bulk of the world's licit opium comes from India and, after each harvest, there is reportedly a "superabundance" of the incised poppy straw. The new plant will extract additional opium from the dried straw, a process that requires industrial equipment. The Embassy in New Delhi does not expect the new poppy straw factory to be built in Singapore by the Norwegians to have any impact on the opium industry in India nor on the Indian opium control system. [REDACTED]

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HONG KONG: NARCOTICS SITUATION MAY BE IMPROVING. The Chief of the Narcotics Bureau is guardedly optimistic that the "battle" against heroin in Hong Kong is slowly being "won." He estimates that, although about one in 75 persons in Hong Kong is a heroin user or abuser, new addicts do not appear to be emerging, and fewer youngsters are being drawn toward drug addiction. He believes the upturn is due to two factors--the decreasing availability of illicit narcotics and their high cost. According to the Hong Kong press, the local price of heroin is now four times the price of gold, and the big suppliers in Thailand are no longer willing to supply the traffickers on credit. According to the narcotics chief, the days of "Mr. Bigs" operating through highly organized drug syndicates are over. He claims that chemists involved in the Hong Kong narcotics scene have been moving to Thailand either to work or to instruct others who will work in the clandestine laboratories there. Big traffickers who made Hong Kong a major drug distribution center apparently have moved elsewhere. The narcotics official sees the root cause of the "drug scourge" in Hong Kong as the desire to escape the humdrum of poor living conditions and poor working conditions rather than any felt need for "kicks" or a feeling of necessity on the part of teenagers to prove themselves to their peers. He speculates that the improving quality of life in Hong Kong--both at home and in the factory--the greater availability of recreational facilities, better balanced preventive education, better publicity, and better rehabilitation facilities have all played major roles in improving the drug situation in Hong Kong. Although somewhat optimistic about the future, he admits that the fight is by no means won and that, although the situation has improved, drug traffickers do not give up easily. [REDACTED]

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NORWAY: NORWEGIAN CHURCH TO ASSIST IN CROP SUBSTITUTION EFFORT IN THAILAND. According to the Oslo press, the Norwegian Church Relief Refugee Program, which has been active in Thailand for several years, intends to play a larger role in the opium control effort in the northern mountainous region of Thailand. The Church Relief Board has decided to participate in a major project designed to combat the production of opium and heroin in the area. Miss Tove Bjerkan, Director of the Norwegian Church Relief Program in Bangkok for nearly three years, has been in charge of relief work in Thailand for refugees from Cambodia and Laos. She has been tasked by her organization to work out detailed plans for Norwegian participation in consultations with UN and Thai authorities on the subject. Norwegian funds will be made available for the project. According to Miss Bjerkan, the Norwegian Church will work in the health sector of the campaign already launched by the UN in Thailand. The initial project will include 30 villages where crop substitution efforts are already under way, but an attempt will be made to expand this effort. Miss Bjerkan plans to establish small public health stations and provide them with necessary equipment.

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She feels that health and hygiene have been largely overlooked thus far in the project area. She intends to recruit young people from the mountain population and train them in public health service. Although Norwegians will manage the project initially, the plan calls for local people eventually to take over the health and hygiene activity. Miss Bjerkan has already completed preliminary studies in the area and expects that the project sponsored by Norway will eventually reach "very considerable dimensions." [REDACTED]

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ITALY: DRUG ABUSE SITUATION WORSENS. According to a recent Embassy report from Rome that recommends support for a new Italian sponsored drug rehabilitation program, all indications point to a rise in drug abuse in Italy. It also noted that Italy continues to be a transit point of some importance in the international trafficking scene. The Embassy further notes that the Italian Government, as well as the population generally, have become increasingly aware of the dimensions and social costs of the Italian narcotics problem. This awareness and concern have drawn greater attention to the narcotics control effort and to the programs and facilities dedicated to drug abuse treatment and rehabilitation. [REDACTED]

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TURKEY: MAJOR CHANGES MADE IN THE MANAGEMENT OF THE PRIMARY OPIUM CONTROL OFFICE. The Turkish Soils Products Office (TMO) has the main responsibility for controlling the production, storage transport, and sale of Turkey's opium poppy crop. A new general director of the TMO and three new assistant directors have recently been appointed. The Embassy reports that early indications point to a more dynamic top management in Ankara that will actively seek solutions to agricultural problems including those involving opium poppy control and production. The new assistant general director of the opium division is expected to be particularly active. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] He is an agricultural engineer and is not expected to be as active as his predecessor in international meetings. [REDACTED]

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TURKEY: MULTISPECTRAL OPIUM POPPY SENSOR PROGRAM IN TRAINING PHASE. The MOPS program being developed in Turkey under UN sponsorship is moving ahead on schedule, according to the latest word from Geneva, but it is expected to have little practical value for the Turks this year. The Government of Turkey has approved the proposed UN "advisers" to accompany the training flights of the MOPS planes; this action should permit the program to move ahead as planned. The Turks have indicated their desire to keep the size of the UNFDAC training team small and the actual air mileage clocked by the team to a minimum. This limitation reflects the traditional Turkish attitude toward foreigners flying in Turkish airspace, especially if it involves areas that may be regarded as sensitive. UN officials appear optimistic that differences over the agreement with the Turks will soon be settled and that necessary training to assure that the MOPS equipment will be properly used by the Turks can be substantially completed by the end of the year. This being the case, the Turkish MOPS program should be in full operation during the next growing season and further tighten Turkish controls of opium poppy cultivation in Turkey. [REDACTED]

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TURKEY: NEW BILL WILL TIGHTEN CONTROLS ON HASHISH. A bill has been submitted to parliament calling for the prohibition of all types of hemp cultivation. The drug hashish is produced from the resin contained in the hemp plant. Containing the mind-affecting tetrahydrocannabinol, the drug has become an increasing problem for Turkey, although not all of the hashish seized in Turkey is of Turkish origin. According to the new bill, once it becomes law those who violate it will be subject to a minimum of one year in prison and a fine of the equivalent of \$200. The bill provides further that the illegally cultivated hemp shall be destroyed by the police, and expenses incurred in the process shall be borne by the cultivator. This new bill is an indication of the growing government concern over the hashish problem, although much of the seized hashish has

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been smuggled in from neighboring countries. Fifty kilograms of hashish, having a market value of approximately \$100,000, was recently seized near Turkey's southern border with Syria. Although this particular case involved an Italian national merely transiting Turkey, there have been an increasing number of cases involving Turkish nationals.

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THAILAND--Kriangsak's Poppy Jungle--Far Eastern Economic Review, 28 April 1978, pp. 23-27. Premier Kriangsak is walking a knife edge on Thailand's highly complex narcotics trade. Whether or not he moves to stem the illicit industry, the political cost could be great, according to Peter Weintraub and David Lawton who wrote the article after extensive research in Bangkok, Rangoon, and the Thai-Burmese border. The Prime Minister has a vital interest in the drug issue. For several years Kriangsak himself was responsible for liaison between the Thai high command and the hodgepodge of private armies of the northern border--armies that are the prime movers in the narcotics industry. Kriangsak appears to recognize his vulnerability. He ordered Khun Sa, (Chan See-fu) and his Shan United Army, to leave Thailand after the Shan leader drew public attention to his narcotics activities in a letter published in a Thai magazine. Observers say that public pressure then forced Kriangsak to issue his ultimatum. It is clear that Khun Sa is a dominant figure in the Golden Triangle opium scene. Some local officials claim that Khun Sa is responsible for about 40 percent of the Golden Triangle drug output. The SUA has long projected an image of intense anti-Communism, and the Thais have come to regard it, and other self-claimed anti-Rangoon rebels, as an effective buffer against the spread of Communist influence within Thailand. While the validity of the buffer theory is questionable, some influential officials in Bangkok fear that the Shan departure may lead to an increase in Communist infiltration into the area. Burmese leaders are watching developments in Thailand with interest, as they view Thai cooperation essential if Rangoon is to deal effectively with its domestic narcotics problem. Meanwhile the Ne Win government in Burma is worried that the Burmese Communists may be able to establish a permanent and strong presence west of the important Salween River--something that it has been unable to do in almost 10 years.

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HONG KONG--Heroin Now Strictly for Cash--TNDD\* No. L/7738, 27 April 1978, p. 13. Drug suppliers in Thailand are now making trafficking more difficult by demanding cash payments instead of accepting credit from Hong Kong dealers--because of growing suspicion among drug dealers. Heroin now is more often smuggled into Hong Kong in its refined state rather than in the raw opium form to be refined locally. According to Mr. Johnston, head of the Hong Kong Narcotics Bureau, quite a number of the local chemists left Hong Kong in 1975 and 1976 and went to Thailand where they are allegedly teaching their Thai counterparts in Thai factories.

MALAYSIA--Fewer Malaysians Arrested Abroad on Drug Charges--TNDD, No. L/7738, p. 21. The number of Malaysian drug offenders caught overseas reached a peak of 132 in 1974 and began to taper off with 92 in 1975, 58 in 1976, and 55 last year. According to the Director of the Central Narcotics Bureau, this steady drop could be attributed to the strong measures being imposed by foreign countries and the fear of life imprisonment or the death penalty. According to a recent survey by Universiti Sains Malaysia, there are estimated to be about 150,000 drug abusers, including both addicts and traffickers, in Malaysia.

MALAYSIA--National Committee to Coordinate Antidrug Activities--TNDD, No. L/7738, p. 23. The government is considering more severe penalties including a mandatory death sentence for drug trafficking, according to the Law Minister who is also the Attorney General. A high-level National Coordinating Committee is to be set up in a stepped-up campaign against drug abuse and trafficking. This committee will coordinate activities related to the enforcement of narcotics laws, rehabilitation of drug addicts, and the prevention of drug abuse under

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a single administration. According to the Attorney General, Malaysia is known to have from 30,000 to 40,000 drug addicts--mostly youths; and for every person who is arrested for drug addiction or who surrenders voluntarily for rehabilitation, eight others remain unknown and therefore cannot be helped.

BRAZIL--Drug Situation in Rio Slums Described--TNDD, No. L/7738, pp. 43-45. Sex crimes, suicides, assaults, and settlings of accounts--the appendages of the drug traffic--have filled the first page of the local press every day for the past six months. Seven tons of Bolivian cocaine (and a part of the Colombian production), pass through Brazil every year en route to the United States, supplying the local market in their passage. In some Latin American countries, where social class distinctions continue to be very sharp, there are two classes of market: that of the poor and that of the rich. Bohemians and young people usually buy their weekly ration in the "favelas" (shantytowns), where the prices are more affordable. In respect to moneyed students, the itinerant suppliers, called "vapo-seiris," station themselves in the vicinity of high schools and universities. The peddlers concentrate on the very young; one addict was only nine years old. In residential neighborhoods, the peddlers station themselves discreetly in the proximity of certain bars or large hotels. A recent survey by a local newspaper has located 21 points or centers for the distribution of cocaine and marijuana. Poverty, as well as money in other milieus, is a powerful ally of the traffickers.

ECUADOR--Government Declares War on Drug Traffickers--TNDD, No. L/7738, pp. 59-61. The law is to be revised to severely punish traffickers. Legal provisions are being revised in order to apply severe sanctions to eradicate this new epidemic that is ravaging Ecuador. The Cabinet has resolved to promote a campaign against the use of and trafficking in drugs. The use of drugs in Ecuador has reached alarming proportions. According to the Government Minister, Ecuador is not a big drug production center but it does serve as a marketplace

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for drugs generally destined for the United States and coming from Bolivia and Peru. Among the steps being taken by the government are the establishment of new legal procedures to speed up court proceedings; revision of the law governing drug traffic to make it more severe and more punitive; reinforcement of police facilities; promotion of police action; a recommendation that the Supreme Court reopen indictments in cases permitted by law; and the reform of penal codes. The Supreme Council of Government has appointed committees to see to it that the decisions adopted are carried out as soon as possible.

PERU--President Recommends Stricter Drug Enforcement Activities--TNDD, No. L/7738, pp. 72-73. President Francisco Morales Bermudez has recommended more energetic measures against drug traffickers. In response to this recommendation the Judicial Department will take more drastic action against narcotics traffickers according to the President of the Peruvian Supreme Court. The devastating and growing drug activity is causing concern at the highest level. Drugs are eating away at the physical and moral defenses of an important part of the Peruvian people. The subject has dramatic overtones for the youth. The vote has been given to those over 18 years of age, as a proof of confidence in the capacity of the new generations of Peruvians. These new citizens should take on the commitment that they have acquired to the country and to their own future with responsibility.

IRAN--Heroin Dealers and Distributors Arrested--TNDD, No. L/7738, pp. 76-83. This is a series of brief items appearing in the Iranian daily press listing the arrests of numerous heroin dealers and distributors by the Iranian Drug and Narcotics Bureau in recent months. Listing of the items here does not indicate an upsurge in such enforcement activities but offers merely a sample of the day-to-day antinarcotics activities of the antinarcotics authorities throughout Iran.

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ITALY--White Paper Exposes Milan Drug Traffickers--TNDD, No. L/7738, pp. 85-90. The article appearing in L'Espresso offers a Who's Who on Drug Dealers in the Milan area, and is based on a book yet to be published titled "Heroin Dossier: Names and Addresses of Dealers in and Around Milan." The book is described as probably the most explosive book published on drugs in recent years. There appears to be a genuine concern that some of those named might try to destroy the manuscript, or the dossiers on which it is based, to prevent publication. Nearly 300 names of hard drug dealers are reportedly listed in the book, and a high percentage of those included are women. As an appendix, there is a map showing locations of actual drug dealings. The book reportedly was months in preparation--including researching newspaper items from 1965 to the present, then verifying court cases and neighborhood by neighborhood of each of the accused and of each suspect. Much of the research included information from rehabilitated addicts who are still familiar with illicit drug circles. The suspects on file actually numbered 800, but addicts dealing in small doses and those cases that were not "water-tight" were not included in the final manuscript. When the book is published, an attempt will be made to encourage those involved in the traffick to collaborate with those sponsoring rehabilitation. The following is a sample entry in the manuscript:

Aprile, Matteo. He lives at Via G. Cesare 5 in Bareggio. As a courier he made trips to France and Holland to purchase heroin, cocaine, and morphine for a gang of dealers operating mostly in the Milan area. He is a friend of Scotti, Sergio (a noted fascist). They were arrested together on 28 April 1976 but regained their freedom after only 2 days.

(The research and writing was done under the auspices of The Autonomous Communist Collectives and the Center for the Struggle and Information Against Heroin.)

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